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previous versions. I.  Introduction 
The theoretical literature on a tariff jumping motive for FDI is well established (e.g. 
Campa et al  (1998),  Horstmann  &  Markusen  (1992),  Motta (1992),  Smith (1987)). 
These  studies  show  under  which  conditions  foreign  firms  prefer  to  set  up  local 
production units over exporting when serving  distant  markets.  The trade-off foreign 
firms typically face in these models is based on the level of the tariff when exporting 
versus  the fixed cost associated  with  setting  up  a  manufacturing  plant abroad.  The 
focus of the models has been on the strategic effects of FDI and entry under different 
trade policy regimes. If the foreign exporter can move first,  strategic FDI may occur 
with the sole objective to deter entry by domestic firms. If  the domestic industry is able 
to move first, higher tariff levels may actually encourage entry and discourage FDI. A 
number of empirical studies have found support for the role of tariffs in inducing FDI 
(e.g. Culem (1988), Belderbos (1997)), while Campa et al.  (1998) found evidence that 
the relationship between tariff levels and FDI depends on the level of concentration in 
the domestic industry. 
As multilateral trade  agreements have limited countries'  ability to  use  tariffs 
and other trade restraints such as  voluntary export requirements (VERs), antidumping 
measures have become increasingly popular trade policy instruments. Recent empirical 
work on the effects of antidumping measures has found evidence that the FDI response 
to  antidumping  actions  is  not  uncommon.  Most  of this  work  has  focused  on  the 
responses to antidumping actions by Japanese firms. Barrel and Pain (1999) found that 
Japanese FDI flows to the EU and the US  in the 1980s were positively affected by the 
overall increase in the number of antidumping actions in the two jurisdictions. Girma 
et al.  (1999), using 4-digit sector level data, found a positive impact of antidumping 
actions  on Japanese FDI in the UK.  Belderbos  (1997),  using  firm level data for the 
Japanese electronics sector, found that antidumping duties in the EU had a substantial 
impact on the probability that Japanese firms  set up manufacturing plants in Europe.1 
Empirical  evidence  has  also  suggested  important  differences  in  the  magnitude  of 
'antidumping jumping' FDI in the EU and the US. Belderbos (1997) estimated the FDI 
response in the US case as about half the size of the FDI response in the EU. Blonigen 
(1998)  confirmed this  feature  of US  antidumping  practice  in  a  firm  level  study  of 
2 Japanese  investments  in  the  US.  The  more  limited  occurrence  of  'antidumping 
jumping'  in  the  US  can  be  explained  from  foreign  firms'  ability  to  obtain  lower 
antidumping duties through a system of administrative reviews by the Department of 
Commerce. If the exporter can  show  that it  has  increased  its  export  price  such that 
dumping no longer occurs, duty payments are not required. The US  system is therefore 
often characterized as  a  'duty avoidance'  system while  EU  antidumping  practice  is 
characterized  as  a  'duty  payment'  system  [Belderbos  (1997),  Van  Bael  and  Bellis 
(1990)]. The EU system does  however allow  foreign  firms  to avoid paying duties by 
raising prices, but this is not automatic: the EU commission has the discretion to agree 
on price undertakings with foreign exporters in  lieu of imposing duties.  The criteria 
used  by  the  Commission  to  decide  which  measures  to  take  remain  intransparant 
[Tharakan  (1991)]  and  appear  to  involve  political  factors  as  well  as  the  expected 
monitoring costs or price undertakings. 
Given the demonstrated importance ofFDI responses to antidumping actions, it 
is  surprising that the theoretical literature on the effects of antidumping law have by 
and large ignored the issue of 'antidumping jumping'. Blonigen and Ohno (1998) focus 
on  the  strategic  interactions  between  exporters  from  different  countries  facing  the 
possibility of antidumping measures. In a two-period model, they show the possibility 
of a  'protection building equilibrium'  where a foreign  firm that intends to  engage in 
second period FDI will increase its first period export in order to increase the level of 
protection faced by the rival foreign firm that continues to export in the second period. 
Haaland and  Wooton (1998)  are  concerned  with the  effects  of economic  integration 
involving the abolition of antidumping  law.  In  a symmetric  model of two  countries 
considering reciprocal (anti-)dumping and reciprocal FDI, they find that producers in 
both countries would gain  from  the  abolition of (reciprocal)  antidumping  law.  This 
result  is  obtained because  antidumping  that  induces  FDI  increases  competition  and 
leaves lower producer profits. 
In  this  paper  we  analyze  the  occurrence  of FDI  and  the  welfare  effects  of 
antidumping law  using a model that closely follows  actual EU antidumping practice. 
Contrary to the symmetric model of Haaland and Wooton (1998), we explicitly take on 
board  cost  asymmetries,  i.e.  a  cost  advantage  of the  foreign  firm.  Such  a  cost 
advantage is the most likely reason for  intense price competition by foreign exporters 
1 This impact was conditional on a sufficient level of competitiveness possessed by the Japanese finns. 
3 leading  to  antidumping  petitions.2.  We  aIlow  marginal  costs  to  be  either  'firm-
specific', in which case cost advantages are internationaIIy transferable through FDI, or 
'location specific', in which case local production forces the foreign firm to relinquish 
its  cost  advantage  and  produce  at  the  same  marginal  cost  as  those  of domestic 
producers. In the model, the EU intervenes first  while taking into account that foreign 
firms  may respond to  antidumping measures by  setting up manufacturing facilities  in 
Europe.  A  major  focus  of the  paper  is  the  rationale  behind  the  choice  by  the  ED 
administration to settle antidumping actions by duties or undertakings. In practice, the 
EU  is  a  frequent  user  of price-undertakings.  Hence  it  is  opportune  to  explicitly 
consider it as an alternative outcome of antidumping procedures.3 We analyze the ED 
antidumping  decision  under  two  alternative  objective  functions  of  the  ED 
administration: maximizing domestic firms' profits and  maximizing total EU welfare. 
The  latter objective  corresponds  most  closely  to  the  'Public  Interest'  clause  in  ED 
antidumping  law,  which demands that the  ED administration takes  into  account the 
effects of proposed measures on all affected parties in he ED (including consumers and 
user  industries).  The  former  objective  corresponds  to  the  more  basic  objective  of 
protecting ED  industry.  A  last  aspect  of ED  antidumping  practice  included  in  our 
analysis is that antidumping measures are in most cases designed to  stop foreign firms 
from undercutting EU producers' prices and 'meet the competition' on the ED market 
(Vandenbussche  1995).  This  implies  that  antidumping  duties  and  undertakings  are 
determined by the level of price undercutting. The extent of foreign price-undercutting 
in  tum is  a function  of the  prevailing  cost  asymmetry  between  the  foreign  and  the 
domestic firm. 
While  other  papers  in  the  FDI  literature  have  compared  VERs  with  tariffs 
(Konishi et a1.1998; Levinsohn (1989); HiIIman and Drsprung (1988)), our paper is the 
first to compare the effects on FDI of antidumping  duties  with the  effects of price-
undertakings. Konishi et al (1998) show that VERs may be preferred to tariffs by local 
2 Given the documented strong bias  in favor of a finding of positive dumping margins implied by the 
administrative procedures [Finger (1992), Van Bael and Bellis (1990)].  Some evidence is provided by 
the importance of cases targeting low cost producers. Out of 246 ED antidumping cases initiated at the 
product level between 1985-90, 70 percent targeted exporters from low wage countries (Vandenbussche 
et a!.,  1999). 
3 See also Laird (1999). Among 249 ED AD-cases examined by the European Commission during 1985-
1990, 21  percent were terminated without any measures, 30 percent ended in a price undertaking and 49 
percent ended in duties (figures based on Official Journal of the EC, L-series, 1985-95). 
4 administrations because they generate higher lobbying contributions, but also because 
VERs may have a stronger FDI deterring effect. Since foreign firms gain from aVER, 
FDI it is less likely to occur. The choice between undertakings and antidumping duties 
modeled  in  this  paper  has  similar  features,  with  price  undertakings  being  able  to 
dissuade  foreign  from  engaging  in  FDI.  Duties  that  trigger  FDI  increase  local 
competition and  adversely affect home  profits,  but  consumers  may  gain  from  lower 
prices. Price-undertakings in contrast benefit domestic firms,  while hurting consumers 
through higher prices. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In section II we discuss the 
main features  of ED antidumping practices and present the  model.  In section III we 
discuss our results and section IV concludes. 
II.  Stylized Facts, Model, and Assumptions 
We consider a three-stage model involving the ED administration, a domestic ED firm, 
and  a  foreign  firm.  In  the  first  stage,  the  ED  antidumping  administration  decides 
whether to  take antidumping measures,  and  if so  which form these measures take:  a 
price  undertaking  or a  duty.  In the  second  stage the  foreign  firm  chooses  between 
exports and FDI. In the third stage the foreign  firm  is  engaged in  price competition 
with the ED firms  on the European market. This sequence of moves implies that the 
FDI versus export decision is  a response to the trade policy measure.4 By solving the 
model through backward induction, we analyze how the threat of FDI may induce the 
administration to  adapt its  choice of trade policy measure.  Since the  model follows 
closely actual ED practice,  some stylized facts  are summarized in  section 2.1  before 
the model structure is detailed in section 2.2. 
2.1 Stylized Facts of  European Antidumping Practice 
European antidumping law  stipulates that  antidumping measures can be imposed on 
foreign  imports  if these  imports  are  dumped  on  the  European  market  and  cause 
material  injury  to  ED  industry.  The  most  common  form  of what  is  regarded  as 
dumping  in  the  legal  sense  is  international  price-discrimination  between  countries 
4 In paragraph 3.3 we relax this assumption. 
5 where the price in the export market is  lower than the price of a product in  the home 
market. Measures can be taken when the foreign product is considered a'like product', 
i.e.  similar  to  the  product  manufactured by ED producers.  A  major  feature  of ED 
antidumping practice is that the degree of injury to ED industry caused by the dumped 
imports is usually measured as the extent to  which import prices are undercutting ED 
industry  prices  (Vandenbussche  1995).  A  related  feature  is  that  the  level  of 
antidumping duties is set specifically to eliminate this injury as measured by the extent 
of foreign price undercutting. Or to put it differently, antidumping measures are aimed 
at  ensuring equal prices for  the  European  and  the  foreign  products in  the  ED.s  The 
Administration's power to pursue this objective has been strengthened substantially by 
an  amendment  to  ED  antidumping  law  in  1988  that  included  an  'anti-absorption 
clause'. This clause entails that in case exporters do not increase prices with the amount 
of the  duty,  the  domestic  industry can petition for  a new  investigation  in  which the 
duty will be treated as a cost for the exporter when calculating dumping margins. If  the 
exporter is found to have 'absorbed' the duty, further (retroactive) duties can be levied.  6 
An antidumping measure can come in two forms; a duty or a price-undertaking. 
While  a duty in  the  ED  system functions  as  a tariff that  increases  the costs  of the 
foreign  firm to  supply the ED  market,  a price-undertaking  is  a commitment by the 
foreign firm to  set its price at an  agreed level.  The ED objective to  force the foreign 
firm to  'meet the ED price' implies that the price undertaking obliges the foreign firm 
5  Although EU  antidumping  law  stipulates  that measures  imposed  should  offset the  smaller of the 
dumping or injury margin (this is called the 'lesser duty rule'), case evidence has revealed that in the 
majority of cases, duty levels are set equal to the (smaller) injury margin (Vermulst and Waer (1991); 
Vandenbussche (1995)). This practice contrasts with US  antidumping rules,  which stipulate that duties 
have to  be  set equal to the dumping margin.  US  antidumping in this  sense  are  not designed to  offset 
injury but rather to eradicate dumping. 
6 The anti absorption clause has in practice been used effectively a number of times. For instance, anti-
absorption investigations launched against imports of electronics weighing scales from  Singapore and 
television broadcasting cameras from  Japan resulted in  new antidumping duties at levels substantially 
above  the  original  antidumping  order.  See  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1952/97  of 7 October  1997 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1015194 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of television 
camera  systems originating in Japan,  Official journal NO.  L 276,  09/1011997  P.  20-28,  and Council 
Regulation  (EC)  No  2937/95  of 20  December  1995  amending  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2887/93  by 
imposing an additional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic weighing scales originating in 
Singapore, Official journal NO. L 274, 1711111995. 
6 to  equate its price to  the price  set by domestic producers.? The ED Commission has 
considerable discretion in  choosing between undertakings and duties,  while the rules 
governing this choice are not defined in antidumping law and remain non-transparent. 
A last feature ofEU antidumping practice relevant for our analysis concerns the 
the  'Public Interest'  clause  included in ED antidumping  law. 8  Article  21  of the EU 
antidumping law states that: "measures ... may not be applied where the authorities ... , 
can clearly conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply such measures".9 
In  other  words,  the  administration  is  held  to  verify  that  adopting  measures,  while 
favouring  the  petitioning industry,  does  not  have  disproportional  adverse  affects  on 
other affected parties, such as consumers and user industries. Until the late  1980s, this 
verification  was  not  very  elaborate  and  observers  of  antidumping  practice  have 
concluded that the  administration equated the  'Community interest'  with the interests 
of EU producers.lo  In recent years, the public interest clause has been further defined 
and its role has been strengthened with the granting of the right of legal representation 
in antidumping procedures to  consumer groups and user industries [Tharakan (1999)]. 
However,  the  administration  maintains  an  important  level  of  discretion  in  the 
implementation of the  clause  and  it  remains  unclear to  what extent the objective  of 
antidumping  actions  has  evolved  from  protecting  EU  producers  to  protecting  the 
interests of all affected parties in the ED. In the model below, we will therefore analyse 
the  interactions  between  antidumping  measures  and  FDI  under  two  alternative 
objective functions.  A 'limited'  objective function  consisting of ED producer profits 
only,  and  an  'inclusive'  objective functions  including profits, consumer surplus,  and 
tariff revenue. II 
7 Given the observed EU practice in duty setting, this conclusion is evident. It should however be noted 
that this cannot be verified empirically since the content of  price undertakings is never disclosed. 
8 Such a clause is also included in Canadian antidumping law, but is absent in US antidumping law. 
9 See Council Regulation No 384/96 of22 December 1995. 
10  See Bellis (1990), where it is noted that until 1988 the European Commission had only once formally 
invoked the Community interest clause. 
II  Not  included  in  the  objective  functions  are  the  profits  in  vertically  related  industries.  See 
Sleuwaegen, Belderbos and Jie-A-Joen (1999) for a model on trade policy effects with vertical relations. 
7 2.2 Model and Assumptions 
The analysis will concentrate on the ED market and abstract from modeling the foreign 
market.  The focus of the analysis is on the injury margin induced by cost asymmetries 
between local and foreign  producers.  Without modelling explicitly the  prices  in the 
foreign market, the dumping condition is  exogeneously imposed on the model. 12  For 
simplicity we develop the model using linear demand functions. Demand functions for 





where p refers to  the price of the European product and  p  * refers  to the price of the 
foreign  product in  the  ED market.  The  parameter  a  represents  the  size  of the  ED 
market  for  the  products.  The  parameter  k  is  a  measure  of the  degree  of product 
differentiation  between  the  domestic  and  the  foreign  product  and  determines  the 
intensity  of price competition.  For  k = 0  products  are  completely  independent  and 
competition is  absent. With  k  close to  1 products are only marginally differentiated 
and price competition is intense. Since antidumping actions involve 'similar' products, 
k will typically be closer to  1. In the model we let  k  vary but we  assume cross-price 
effects to be smaller than own price effects (0::; k < 1). 
Let c denote the (constant) marginal cost of production for the ED firm and c* 
the marginal cost of production for the foreign firm in  its  home market. The marginal 
cost of serving the ED  market through export for  the  foreign  firm  is  c * +s, with  s 
denoting unit transport costs. We assume that the foreign firm has a cost advantage in 
the Free Trade case such that  c * +s < c. This assumption ensures that the Free Trade 
equilibrium is characterized by price-undercutting by the foreign firm (p* < p). Foreign 
price-undercutting  in  our model thus  reflects  a cost  advantage  rather than an  unfair 
trade practice by the foreign importer. The extent of price undercutting determines the 
12  The  reciprocal  Haaland  &  Wooton  (1998)  model  explicitly  analyses  both  domestic  and  foreign 
markets.  Dumping arises in their model, even with symmetric costs,  because of price discrimination 
motives. 
8 degree of injury found in the antidumping investigation and may eventually lead to the 
imposition of antidumping measures. 
The cost advantage of the foreign firm may stem from a comparative advantage 
of the foreign location (e.g. low wage costs in case oflabor intensive industries, or low 
input costs of raw materials in case of process industries) or a competitive advantage of 
the foreign firm (e.g. a technological advantage leading to greater efficiency or product 
quality). In order to bring out clearly the consequences of these different types of costs, 
we analyse the two polar cases  of 1)  full  location specific costs, in  which case cost 
advantages  are  not  transferable,  and  2)  full  firm-specific  costs,  in  which  case  cost 
advantages are completely transferable. In case of location specific costs, FDI implies 
a production cost for the foreign firm in the ED market equal to c, the production cost 
that applies to the ED firm.  In case of firm specific costs, FDI allows the foreign firm 
to produce in the ED at marginal cost c*  and hence allows the firm to reduce marginal 
costs by transport cost s,  as  compared to the Free Trade case. FDI is  of course much 
more  likely  to  occur  in  case  of transferable  firm-specific  cost  advantages  13 •  In 
paragraphs 3.1  and  3.2 we  focus  on the two polar cases,  while  in  paragraph 3.3  the 
results in case of intermediate levels of  transferability are discussed. 
We first illustrate the effects of duties and undertakings on equilibrium prices 
in  the  absence of FDI  responses.  The  profit  functions  of the  domestic  and  foreign 
firm14 under Free Trade are: 
(3a) 
(3a) 
In case the foreign firm is exporting while a duty, or a price undertaking (und) prevails, 
its profits are: 
(4b) 
13  The theory of the multinational firm suggests that an important element in firms'  decisions to move 
abroad is the extent to which firms possess  intangible, firm-specific  assets that are transferable abroad 
(e.g.  Dunning,  1988;  Caves,  1995).  The  transferability of cost  advantages  also  depends  on  external 
factors such as whether the foreign firm faces local content rules for its manufacturing operations. In the 
latter case 'location specific' costs are more important. 
14  Since the  number of firms  is  given  in  the  model,  the  entry-deterring motive  for  FDI (e.g.  Smith 
(1987»  is not considered. 
9 (4c) 
In accordance with the 'stylized facts' of ED antidumping practice we assume that both 
price  undertakings  and  duties  force  the  foreign  firm  to  'meet'  the  price  set  by  the 
European  producer  of the  'like  product'  in  the  European  market,  eliminating  the 
'injury'. Hence,  we assume that the duty level is  set  such that equal prices result ex-
post.  Although the foreign  firm  could (partly)  absorb  the  tariff,  duty  levels  can  be 
adjusted as  long as  there is no  price equalization, as  the anti-absorption legislation of 
1988 stipulates. With duties and price-undertakings leading to identical prices, foreign 
firms will typically prefer price-undertakings. While foreign profits are reduced by the 
duty payments, the foreign firm fully retains the benefits from higher prices in case of 
price-undertakings. In the case of a duty, part of the foreign profits are shifted to the 
ED in terms of duty revenue. Domestic firms will be ambivalent towards the choice of 
measures: with the foreign price equal under undertakings and duties, domestic profits 
are also equal. 
Figure  1 shows the best response functions of the  two  firms  and the  shift  in 
equilibrium prices as  a result  of the imposition of duties or undertakings.  Given the 
cost advantage of the foreign firm in case of Free Trade, the Free Trade equilibrium is 
characterized by  price undercutting  (P*Fr<PFr).  Hence,  the  intersection of the  home 
and foreign firm's best response functions is  situated below the 45°-degree line. If  the 
ED imposes a duty t, this results in an upward shift of the foreign firm's best response 
function R*(p). The duty is  set to offset the injury to the domestic firm which implies 
that prices should be equal, with the new equilibrium on the 45°-degree line. The duty 
which accomplishes this is equal to the cost difference between the two firms (t = c-c*-
s) as shown in Vandenbussche et al.  (1997). 
Insert FIGURE 1 here 
In case of a price undertaking, the foreign firm is committed to 'meet the price' set by 
the  local  firm  such  that  p*=p.  The  home  firm's  best  response  function  is  left 
unchanged,  while the  foreign  firms'  best response function  becomes the 45°-degree 
10 (p=p*) line. 15  The intersection of the domestic firm's best response and the 45°-degree 
line gives the equilibrium with a price-undertaking, which is  equal to the equilibrium 
attained under a duty of  the size t= c-c*-s. 
In  summary,  the  imposition  of antidumping  measures  (a  duty  or  a  price-
undertaking) raises the foreign  firm's price,  and  must  also  lead to  an  equivalence  in 
home and foreign prices:  p'  duty  = p'  UND  = P duty  = PUND' The ranking of prices for the 
domestic firm thus becomes: (p  FT  < Pduty  = p'  UND) and similarly for the foreign firm. 
III. EU Antidumping and FDI Reponses 
In this  section, EU antidumping policy is  analyzed taking  into account the possibility 
ofFDI choice by the foreign firm.  We will present the model results separately for two 
polar  cost  cases:  location  specific  costs  (paragraph  3.1)  vs.  frrm-specific  costs 
(paragraph 3.2). In the final  paragraph we  discuss extensions  of the model including 
the case of intermediate levels of cost advantage transferability. 
3.1. Location Specific Costs 
We  solve  the  model  backwards,  starting  with  the  price  game under  different  trade 
policy  measures,  moving  to  the  FDI  versus  export  choice  of the  foreign  firm  and 
ending with the decision problem for the EU administration. 
The foreign firm 
In  the  last  stage of the  model,  several  outcomes can  arise.  In case the  foreign  firm 
engages in FDI, its profit function is 
;r:'  FDi =  (p  •  FDI  - c).q·  FDi  - F  (5) 
where F represents the  fixed  cost of setting up  a plant in  the  EU and  subscript FDf 
denotes  FDI  equilibrium.  Given  that  costs  are  location  specific,  marginal  costs  of 
production are equal for the two firms in the FDI equilibrium, and prices are also equal 
15  It  is  assumed  that  both  firms  continue  to  move  simultaneously  after  a  price  undertaking.  See 
Vandenbussche et aI.  (1997) for an analysis of price-undertakings assuming that these bestow the local 
firm with a first mover advantages, turning it into a Stackelberg leader. 
II (p  *  FDI  =  PFDI).  In  case  the  foreign  firm  exports,  the  foreign  firm's  profits  function 
under Free Trade (FT),  a duty,  or a price  undertaking  (uncI)  are as  described  in  (4). 
Recall that  p'  dut),  = p'  UND  = P duty  = PUND • Because the duty is  set to  equalize marginal 
costs, price equilibrium under antidumping  measures  is  the  same  as  under FDI.  The 
ranking of  prices for the foreign firm thus becomes: ( p'  IT < P * duty  = P  • UND  = P  • FDi ). 
The  foreign  firm's  profit  ranking  given  equilibrium  prices  determines  the 
choice between exporting and  FDI.  Under Free Trade, the foreign firm prefers export 
to FDI since it  faces  higher marginal cost of production abroad and at the  same time 
has to incur the fixed FDI cost F.  In the case of a duty of the size t=c*-c-s the foreign 
firm prefers to export as long as the fixed cost F is positive. This is because FDI in case 
of location specific costs, while allowing the firm to avoid duty payments, also forces 
it  to  relinquish its cost advantage. Hence, with the duty level set equal to the level of 
cost  asymmetry,  variable  profits  under  FDI  are  equal  to  profits  under  export  with 
duties, but under FDI the foreign firm has to incur F. In case of a price-undertaking the 
foreign firm is even more inclined to choose for export. Under export the foreign firm 
can produce at a lower marginal cost(c+s) than when it engages in FDI (c). 
To conclude, with location specific costs the foreign firm always prefers export 
to  FDI  whatever antidumping  measure  is  imposed.  No  'antidumping jumping'  FDI 
occurs because antidumping duties and price undertakings, being restricted to eliminate 
price  undercutting,  cannot  compensate  the  cost  increase  resulting  from  switching 
production to the EU. 
The EU Administration 
Taking into account the  foreign firm's FDI versus export choice and consequent price 
competition, the EU antidumping administration decides whether to take antidumping 
measures and if so,  whether these take the form of a duty or a price undertaking. The 
administration can take decisions either on the basis of a 'limited'  objective function 
that only includes domestic profits, or an  'inclusive' objective function corresponding 
more closely with the  'Community interest'. The latter can be  represented by the EU 
12 welfare function  W,  consisting of the  sum of ED consumer surplus  (CS), European 
firm's profits and possibly duty revenue:]6 
W = CS +1C+t.q'  (6)\ 
In case the ED administration employs a 'limited'  objective function,  it  will  always 
reach an affirmative decision, as  antidumping measures increase the ED firm's profis. 
Given that equilibrium prices are the same under undertakings and duties, the domestic 
firm and the ED administration are ambivalent towards the choice of measure. In case 
the ED administration  employs  the  'inclusive'  welfare  function  in  (6)  to  determine 
antidumping policy, it will always prefer to levy a duty. This can be shown as follows. 
For the duty to be preferred two conditions should hold. A positive duty should yield 
higher welfare, and a duty should provide greater welfare benefits than an undertaking. 
It can be shown that a duty will indeed always increase ED welfare as  dWI  > 0  (the 
dt  ,=0 
derivation is  relegated to the appendix).]7 It is  also  easily verified that duties lead to 
higher welfare  than undertakings.  Since  a  duty  and  a  price-undertaking  lead  to  the 
same equilibrium prices and quantities, consumer surplus and the ED firm's profits are 
equal, but a duty generates duty revenues that accrue to the ED. The outcome in case 
of location specific production costs can be summarized as follows: 
With location specific production costs, no 'antidumping jumping' FDf occurs. The EU 
administration  using  an  'inclusive'  welfare  function  corresponding  with  the 
'Community interest' will levy duties.  In  case the EU administration uses a  'limited' 
objective function focused on EU  firm profits, both undertakings and duties are equally 
preferred. In any case,  the foreign firm will continue to export to the EU. 
]6 Ignored in this welfare function is any advantage to the local economy from FDI,  such as improved 
domestic employment (Brander and  Spencer,  1987) or positive  spillovers leading to improvements in 
local firms' productivity (Blomstrom & Kokko,  1992). 
l7 It should be  noted that this  result no  longer strictly holds  if duty revenue  is  omitted from  the EU 
welfare function. 
13 3.2 Firm Specific Costs 
In this paragraph we assume that the foreign firm when engaging in FDI can continue 
to produce at its lower marginal cost c*, while avoiding transport costs s.  This situation 
occurs if firm specific cost advantages are perfectly transferable abroad. To study FDI 
reponses to  EU antidumping  policy,  we  start  again by  describing  the  foreign  firm's 
payoff structure. 
The foreign finn 
When the foreign firm engages in FDI its profits are: 
(7a) 
Because the  foreign  firm can produce at  its  lower firm-specific  cost in  the EU  and 
avoid paying transport costs 8, the price for the foreign product is  now  lower than the 
price set by the EU firm:  p *  FDl  < pFDI,  and prices for  both firms  are  lower with FDI 
than in case of  Free Trade (p  *  FDl  < P *  FT  and pFDI < pIT ).18 
When the foreign firm exports, its profit functions under free trade, a duty, and 
a price-undertaking are: 
'liIT = (P*IT _co -s).q*FT 
n*duty  = (p*duty  _co -s-t).q*duty 




It is  worth recalling  that  prices  in  the  EU  market  in  case  of effective  antidumping 
duties or undertakings are higher than in the Free Trade case (as illustrated in figure  1), 
which  results  in  the  following  ranking  of  foreign  firm's  prices: 
p*  FDl  < P*IT < p'duty  = p'UND 
We can now analyze the foreign firm's choice between export and FDI.  In the 
case of  Free Trade, the foreign firm prefers to export if the fixed cost F is large relative 
to the  transport cost  s,  as  can  be  seen  by  comparing  (7b)  and  (7a).  We denote the 
critical level of fixed costs that induces a switch from export to FDI under Free Trade 
by  p*  IT. With F < p*  FT  the Free Trade case will see the foreign firm engage in FDI. 
14 Since in that case there would be no  exports to the EU, no  dumping or injury occurs 
and anti-dumping law is inconsequential. 
In  case  of a  price-undertaking,  the  foreign  firm  faces  a  similar  trade  off 
between  transport  costs  s  and  fixed  FDI  costs  F  (compare  (7d)  en  (7a)).  Since 
exporting under a price-undertaking leads to higher prices and profits than under Free 
Trade (see figure 1), the critical fixed cost that will induce a switch from export to FDI 
has to be smaller than under Free Trade: F'  Und < F'  FT  ,  with the difference between the 
two depending on the cost advantage of the foreign  firm.  This  implies that there is  a 
range  of fixed  cost levels under which the foreign  firm would not engage in FDI in 
case of an undertaking, while it would invest under free trade, before antidumping can 
be taken. 
In case of a duty, marginal costs under exports include the duty t in addition to 
transport  costs  s.  Given  the  higher  marginal  costs,  the  foreign  firm  can  only  be 
discouraged from engaging in FDI by higher levels of fixed costs:  F'Duty  > F'  FT. The 
difference between F'  Duty  and  F'  FT  is a function ofthe duty level, and therefore again 
depends on the cost advantage of the foreign firm. 
The above implies the following ranking of critical fixed costs:  F'Duty > F*  FT > 
F'  Und > 0.19 Table 1 summarizes the foreign firm's decisions depending on the level of 
fixed  costs and  the presence  or absences  of antidumping  measures.  In case  of high 
fixed costs (column 4) export is a dominant strategy and FDI will never be chosen. For 
intermediate levels of fixed costs, as in column (3),  'antidumping jumping' FDI arises 
when duties are imposed. Undertakings would maintain the export outcome. For lower 
levels  of fixed  cost (2)  the  foreign  firm prefers FDI  except  when  an  undertaking  is 
imposed,  in  which  case  it  would  prefer to  export.  Note  that  since  the  foreign  firm 
prefers  exporting  with  an  undertaking,  if  it  could,  it  would  want  to  invoke  an 
undertaking decision by the EU government. Strategically committing not to engage in 
FDI could induce such an undertaking decision. In the absence of strategic foreign firm 
behavior, however, the firm's decision in free trade circumstances to incur fixed cost F 
and produce in the EU makes antidumping law inconsequential as exports are reduced 
18  This can be seen from figure  1. In the case of finn specific costs, the reaction function of the foreign 
finn in case of FDI lies below its Free Trade one. Therefore, the intersection with the home finn's best 
response function will result in equilibrium prices that lie below Free Trade values for both finns. 
19 The full specification of the critical fixed cost functions is provided in appendix B. 
15 to zero. In this case FDI occurs, but it  is  not of the  'antidumping jumping' kind.  The 
same applies when fixed costs are even lower, leaving FDI to be the dominant choice, 
as in case (1). With anti-dumping policies inconsequential, columns (1) and (2)  are not 
relevant  for  further  analysis  of government  policy  in  this  section,  but  they  are 
nevertheless included for the sake of completeness. 
Table 1: Exports versus FDI decision of the foreign firm depending on fixed costs 
p*  Und <F< F*  FT  F*  FT <F< p*  Duty  F>  P*DUty 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Free Trade  FDI  FDI  Export  Export 
Duty  (FDI)  (FDI)  FDI  Export 
Undertaking  (FDI)  (Export)  Export  Export 
Note: chOices wlthrn brackets are hypothetical srnce antidumprng actions cannot be taken III the absence 
of exports 
The European Administration 
The administration has to decide between imposing measures or not and if so, the type 
of measures, taking into account the export versus FDI choice of the foreign firm and 
subsequent price competition in the EU market. We again distinguish between the use 
of a 'limited' and  'inclusive' objective function. The possible equilibria as  a function 
of  critical fixed costs and the degree of production cost asymmetry between the foreign 
and EU producer are illustrated in figure 2.20 As we move to the right on the horizontal 
axis, the production cost asymmetry (c*/c) between the EU and  foreign firm becomes 
smaller. 
We consider first the case of an inclusive objective function. The top area in the 
figure  corresponds with column (4)  in table  1 and  indicates the area where levels of 
fixed  costs  are  so  high  that  the  foreign  firm  will  never  engage  in  FDI.  The  EU 
administration anticipating the foreign firm's decision, will levy an antidumping duty. 
The  duty  revenue  and  increase  in  the EU firm's  profits  compensate for  the  loss  in 
consumer surplus. Hence EU welfare is higher than under Free Trade. For a given level 
of FDI costs F, this outcome becomes less likely the larger is the cost advantage of the 
20 The parameters values used to compute figure 2 are: a=12, e=2, s= 0.5, k=D.7, and 0 < c* < 1.5. 
16 foreign firm,  because cost asymmetry increases the duty level and hence increases the 
incentives for FDI. 
In the intermediate area where the fixed cost of FDI lies in between the critical 
values  that induces a switch from FDI to  export under a duty  and  under Free  Trade 
(F*FT < F < F*dut), we can observe duties imposed, followed by 'antidumping jumping' 
FDI. In this area, duty revenues are irrelevant since duties are always jumped. But EU 
consumer surplus  increases  as  FDI reduces  the  marginal  costs  for  the  foreign  firm, 
increases price competition, and reduces prices. While profits of the EU firm decrease, 
this effect is smaller in magnitude, bringing total EU welfare to a higher level. The EU 
Government  foreseeing  duty  jumping FDI  still  prefers  to  levy  duties,  since  in  the 
absence of duties or with  an  undertaking,  the consequent export equilibrium fails  to 
generate duty revenues and  lowers  overall EU welfare.  The  range of fixed  costs for 
which this duty jumping FDI occurs becomes markedly smaller as the cost differential 
between the foreign and the domestic firm narrows. A smaller cost differential leads to 
a smaller duty level and  makes  the FDI decision  more similar to the decision  under 
Free Trade. 
In the bottom two areas of figure 2, FDI costs are as low as to induce FDI under 
Free  Trade.  Hence,  no  initial  export  takes  place  and  antidumping  law  is 
inconsequential. The FDI that occurs is not of the jumping kind, since it prevails in the 
absence  of  duties.  Although  the  imposition  of  a  price-undertaking  could  have 
prevented the foreign firm from engaging in FDI, at least in the area where F > F*  dUb 
antidumping actions cannot be initiated and this equilibrium is never reached.21 
In  case  the  EU  administration  adopts  a  limited  objective  function,  some 
equilibrium outcomes are affected. The main difference between limited and inclusive 
objective functions  occurs in  the area of intermediate fixed  FDI costs22.  If only the 
benefits  to EU producers  count,  the  EU  will  impose  price-undertakings  instead  of 
duties and the  foreign firm will export. Antidumping jumping FDI will therefore not 
21  The F*  "d is upward sloping because with smaller cost differentials, undertakings lead to smaller price 
increases  and  are  less  beneficial  to  the  foreign  firm.  Although  the  FDI  option  also  becomes  less 
profitable as  the associated decrease in marginal costs is reduced, the effect on undertakings is larger, 
such that a higher fixed cost is necessary to keep the firm from investing. 
22 In case of high fixed costs and moderate or low cost asymmetries in the top area of figure 2,  the EU 
administration may still choose to impose duties. But since undertakings have the same effect on the EU 
firm's profits and are equally effective in case of a limited objective function,  undertakings may equally 
be chosen.  In any case, no FDI is observed. 
17 occur as in the case of an inclusive welfare function.23  The price-undertaking increases 
both the home and the foreign firm's profits above the free  trade level and  dissuades 
the  foreign  firm  from  engaging  in  FDI.  But consumer  surplus  is  strongly  reduced 
compared with its free trade level. 
In  summary,  'antidumping  jumping'  FDI  can  only  occur  in  case  the  ED 
administration  adopts  an  inclusive  objective  function  taking  into  account  consumer 
interests. In addition, the fixed FDI costs should neither be too high,  since this makes 
the  FDI  option  too  unattractive,  nor  too  low,  since  then  FDI  would  be  occurring 
irrespective of antidumping actions.  The  larger  is  the  cost  advantage of the  foreign 
firm,  the  more  likely that  antidumping jumping FDI  occurs.  In  contrast,  if the  ED 
administration  adopts  a limited  objective  function,  price-undertakings  would  be  the 
preferred measure, leaving no incentives for jumping FDI. 
With intermediate levels offixed FDI costs ( F* FT < F < F* Duty), FDI as a response to 
EU antidumping  duties  is  observed,  but only  if the  EU  administration  adopts  an 
'inclusive'  objective function  taking  into  account consumer  interests.  In  case  of a 
'limited' objective function  that only takes  into account EU industry profits,  a price 
undertaking will result and 'antidumping jumping' FDI is not observed. 
It is  worth  noting  that  in  case  of 'antidumping jumping'  FDI,  the  domestic 
producer sees its profits decline compared with the free trade case. A forward looking 
ED  producer  that  possesses  perfect  information  and  does  not  face  uncertainty 
concerning the outcome of ED antidumping proceedings, would choose not to petition 
for antidumping actions.  However, the uncertainty surrounding the objective function 
that  the  ED  administration  is  using,  may  have  ED  firms  petition  for  protection 
expecting the use of a limited objective function (resulting in undertakings) rather than 
a a more inclusive function. In practice, the ED administration has attempted to reduce 
the harmful effect of antidumping jumping FDI on ED firms'  profits by legislating the 
'screwdriver plant' amendment  in  1987,  which allowed the administration to  impose 
23 It could also be noted that in case the EU administration, acting in home producers' interest, did not 
have the option to impose undertakings, it would prefer not to take  any  antidumping measures in this 
18 cost raising  local content requirements  on the foreign  firms  [see  Belderbos  (1997)]. 
Local content requirements  makes  costs more  location  specific  and  cost  advantages 
less transferable.  In case of partially transferable cost advantages of the foreign firm, 
FDI can be associated with a profit increase of the  EU firm.  This scenario  is  briefly 
discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Extensions 
In this paragraph we discuss some possible extensions to our model and the robustness 
of our results with respect to changes in the model. 
Impeifectly Transferable Cost Advantages 
In order to  illustrate the importance of the type of cost advantages, we have analysed 
the  interactions between antidumping  decisions  and  FDI for  the  two  polar  cases  of 
completely location-specific costs vs.  prefectly transferable cost advantages.  We  can 
model intermediate cases of transferability or location specificity as  follows.  Let the 
marginal  cost  of the  foreign  firm  in  case  of FDI  be:  c  ~Dl = C * + r(  c - c *),  where 
Os r s 1  measures  the  extent  of location-specificity.  A  value  of one  implies  full 
location specific costs, and  a value of zero full  transferability.  If r  takes on higher 
positive values, both the F* duty line and the F* FT  line shift downwards while the slopes 
of the  lines  decrease:  with  less  transferable  cost  advantages,  the  critical  fixed  cost 
levels dissuading the foreign firm from FDI are smaller, while the sensitivity of fixed 
costs with respect to the  marginal cost advantages becomes smaller. It can be  shown 
that the  larger effect  is  on the F* duty  line,  such  that  the  area in  which  antidumping 
jumping  FDI  occurs  decreases  in  size  with  larger  values  of  r.  Hence  the  less 
transferable is the cost advantage of the foreign firm, the less likely it is that the foreign 
firm would engage in anti-dumping jumping FDI, c.p. 
While the foreign firm is less likely to prefer FDI when cost advantages are less 
transferable, the welfare implications in the cases in which it does choose for FDI have 
also  altered.  With  the  cost  advantages  less  transferable  through  FDI,  the  pro-
case.  As  such,  the  provision  for  undertakings  embedded  in  EU  antidumping  law  can  be  seen  as 
increasing the incidence of affirmative antidumping cases. 
19 competitive  effect  of FDI  with  its  associated  increase  in  consumer  surplus  is  also 
smaller.  At  the  same  time,  the  ED firm  may  benefit  from a FDI response,  at  least 
within a certain range of cost parameters. This in case FDI leads  to  an increase in the 
marginal cost of the foreign firm, allowing the domestic firm to increase its price. The 
foreign  firm's  marginal  costs  increase compared  with  the  Free  Trade  equilbrium if 
C ;DI  > C * + s , which implies r(  C - C *) > s: cost increasing FDI is more likely to occur 
if the location specificity parameter r  takes higher values, the cost advantage of the 
foreign firm is greater, and the transport cost s is relatively low. 
Whether the ED administration will impose anti-dumping duties of the jumping 
kind in case of cost increasing FDI depends on the  the objective function of the ED 
administration. In case of a limited objective function,  the administration still prefers 
undertakings over duties, since the former always has the most substantial effect on the 
ED firm's profits. In case of an inclusive objective function, the decision to levy duties 
depends on the trade-off between changes in  consumer surplus  and ED profits.  The 
main  variable  affecting  this  trade  off is  the  extent  of the  cost  disadvantage  of the 
domestic firm. The larger this cost disadvantage, the lower the profitability of the ED 
firm,  and  the  less  likely  that  any  profit  increase  can  compensate  for  reductions  in 
consumer surplus. 
The Foreign Firm as First Mover 
A second extension of the model concerns the order of moves. In the basic model, we 
have  assumed  that  the  foreign  firm  decides  on  export  vs.  FDI  after  the  ED 
administration has decided on its  antidumping policy.  What happens  if we allow the 
foreign firm to decide first whether to invest or not, taking into account the behaviour 
of the  ED administration? With  high  fixed  costs  (F>  F*  Duty),  export  is  a dominant 
choice and will be the outcome irrespective of the order of moves.24 With intermediate 
fixed FDI costs, we can observe FDI in anticipation of the imposition of antidumping 
duties. In the area where (F*  FT < F < F*  Duty), the foreign firm will prefer FDI since it 
foresees  that  an  export  choice  will  result  in  the  imposition  of duties  by  the  ED 
administration, at least if the latter adopts an inclusive objective function.  With duties 
20 and undertakings giving equal prices and quantities, the  former yield duty revenues to 
the  EU.  Hence  'antidumping jumping' FDI can  occur in  the  absence  of any  actual 
duties  being  imposed.25  However,  if the  foreign  firm  is  uncertain  whether  the  EU 
administration will adopt a limited or inclusive objective function,  it  will pay to wait 
until the outcome of the antidumping procedures is certain. If  an undertaking decision 
could be expected, the foreign firm prefers to export. 
When fixed  costs are  within the limits F* FT and  F* und,  a similar outcome will 
prevail,  if a duty is  the  anticipated outcome of an  anti-dumping  procedure.  But if a 
limited objective function is  expected to result in an  undertaking decision, the foreign 
firm will refrain from FDI and continue exporting. Recall that if the foreign firm would 
not  be  a  first  mover,  it  would  invest  in  the  EU,  leaving  anti-dumping  actions 
inconsequential. But if the foreign firm decides first on its strategy for serving the EU 
market through export, taking into account potential EU antidumping measures,  it  will 
refrain  from  FDI  knowing  that  the  ensuing  antidumping  actions  will  lead  to 
undertakings that  increase profits  more  than  FDI.  Hence,  strategic behaviour by  the 
foreign firm can alter antidumping policy by the EU administration. The implication of 
this  is  that in  case the  foreign  firm moves  first  and  behaves strategically,  there  is  a 
distinct possibility that the presence of antidumping law discourages FDI. This result is 
akin  to  the  results  of Motta  (1992)  and  Smith  (1987)  that  there  need  not  be  an 
unequivocal positive relationship between trade restraints and FDI once the possibility 
of strategic investments by foreign firms is taken into account. 
If the foreign finn moves first taking into account antidumping  rules followed by the 
EU administration,  'antidumping jumping' FDI can arise in the absence of  observable 
anti-dumping measures.  On the other hand,  with not too high levels offixed FDI costs 
(F'und <  F  <  F'Du,y),  the  antidumping  rules  followed  by  the  EU  administration 
adopting a limited objective function,  can discourage FDI with  otherwise would have 
taken place, as the foreign finn prefers price increasing undertakings to FDI. 
24  Similarly,  with  very  low  fixed  costs  (F < F* Und),  FDI  is  a  dominant  choice  whatever  the 
administration's decision. 
25  FDI  in  anticipation of antidumping actions  avoids  the  costs  of legal  representation in  antidumping 
cases and any possible negative reputation effect in the EU market stemming from  'dumping' charges. 
Obviously, antidumping anticipating FDI makes the precise quantitative effect of antidumping law  on 
FDI much more difficult to establish empirically. 
21 IV. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed the incentives for foreign firms to engage in FDI under 
European antidumping policy.  For this  purpose we  used a three stage model.  In  the 
first stage, the ED administration decides whether to take antidumping measures, and if 
so, whether to levy a duty or allow a price undertaking. In the second stage the foreign 
firm decides whether to serve the ED market through export or FDI. In the third stage, 
the foreign firm is  engaged in  price competition with a local firm on the ED market. 
Injury arises from a production cost advantage of the foreign firm, which may either be 
location  specific  or firm-specific.  In  the  latter case,  the  foreign  firm  maintains  its 
production cost advantage in case of overseas production. We examined the effect of 
antidumping  when  the  ED  administration  adopts  a  'limited'  objective  function 
consisting of ED industry profits  only,  and  when  it  adopts  an  'inclusive'  objective 
function  consisting of total ED  welfare  (including  consumer  surplus).  Our findings 
suggest that  in  case costs  are  location  specific  and  cost advanages  not  transferable, 
duty levels set on the basis of injury margins (the rule followed in the majority of ED 
antidumping  cases)  are  not  high  enough  to  create  incentives  for  FDI.  Only  if the 
foreign  firm  is  able  to  internalize  and  transfer  abroad  (part  of its)  intrinsic  cost 
advantages,  'antidumping jumping'  FDI can be  observed.  This provided that the ED 
adopts an  'inclusive' objective function and that fixed setup cost for  FDI are  not too 
high. 
In case the  ED administration uses  a  'limited'  objective function,  it  is  more 
likely to negotiate price-undertakings with the foreign firm instead of imposing duties. 
FDI triggered by a duty toughens the price competition for the home firm whenever the 
foreign  firm  can  operate  in  the  ED  market  at  a  lower  marginal  cost  due  to  the 
transferability of firm specific assets.  In order to  avoid the increased competition the 
ED can opt for  a price-undertaking that dissuades the foreign firm from engaging in 
FDI.  Since a price-undertaking  is  a price  fixing  agreement  with effects  similar to  a 
VER it makes exporting more attractive for the foreign firm. 
If the setup of the model is altered to  allow the foreign firm to move before the 
ED administration decides on antidumping policy, two additional outcomes can arise. 
First, 'antidumping jumping' FDI can occur in anticipation of antidumping measures, 
22 while  actual  antidumping  measures  are  never  imposed  because  of the  reduction  in 
exports associated with PDI. Second, if levels of fixed costs are such that the foreign 
firm  would prefer to  export with  an  undertaking,  but  would  choose PDI in  case of 
duties,  it  would  refrain  from  PDI  if an  EU  decision  to  settle  antidumping  actions 
through price-undertakings can be  anticipated. The export choice allows antidumping 
actions  to  take place,  and  provides the  local  industry with the  benefits  of the  price 
fixing arrangement. Hence, the presence of antidumping law can also discourage FDI. 
Our findings  allow  to  shed  a different  light on the  empirical evidence  with 
respect  to  'antidumping-jumping'  PDI.  Empirical work  has  either  focused  on cases 
involving antidumping duties (Belderbos, 1997) or has not made a distinction between 
the type of measured used  (Pain ,1999; Girma et aI.,  1999). Moreover,  all  studies to 
date  have  focused  on  Japanese  ftrms,  which  in  most  cases  possessed  transferable 
competitive advantages and  at  the  same  time  have been unsuccessfull in  negotiating 
undertakings with the EU administration (Tharakan, 1991). These are all circumstances 
pointed  out by  our analysis  to  favour  duty-jumping  FDI.  Our ftndings  suggest  that 
extending the empirical analysis to exports from non-market economies and low-wage 
countries (where cost advantages are more location specific) is likely to show a much 
smaller FOI response to antidumping actions. Likewise PDI responses are predicted to 
be much more muted in case antidumping actions lead to undertakings. 
Our  results  concerning  the  difference  between  undertakings  and  duties  also 
connect  to  the  observed  smaller  incidence  of FDI  in  US  antidumping  cases.  The 
administrative review system (the  'duty avoidance' system) adopted by the US  can in 
fact  be  characterized as  a  system in  which  voluntary price undertakings  by  foreign 
firms  allow  them to  avoid  duty  payments.  The major  difference  with  EU  law  and 
practice is  that such 'undertakings' are automatic,  while the EU administration has a 
high degree of discretion whether to grant undertakings or not. 
Since in the US case foreign firms can choose freely whether to raise prices, the 
initiative lies with the foreign firms, and US  antidumping is more akin to a situation in 
which the foreign firm 'moves first'. This implies that in US  antidumping practice the 
'strategic export' scenario  in  which the foreign  ftrm  induces  antidumping  actions  in 
order to beneftt from price undertakings,  is  a conceivable course of events. This kind 
of 'protection building' trade is  rather different  from the case  described in Blonigen 
and Ohno  (1999).  In the latter analysis,  foreign  firms  planning  to  invest  in  the US 
increase  their  export in  order  to  induce  imposition  of antidumping  duties  that  hurt 
23 competing exporters. Our results suggest that it  is  also  conceivable that foreign firms 
maintain high export levels  and  do  not  implement  profitable  FDI plans  in  order to 
'build  protection'  in  the  form  of profit  increasing  price  fixing  arrangements.  The 
antidumping order allows the firms to increase prices without the threat of legal actions 
under competition law,  as  shown by Prusa (1992). This  strategic  interaction between 
US  antidumping law and FDI decisions could be an  additional explanatory factor for 
the observed limited investment response in case of US antidumping actions. 
A  last  remark  concerns  the  empirical  and  theoretical  analysis  of  EU 
antidumping  decisions  and  the  objective  of EU  antidumping  policy.  The  frequent 
occurrence  of FDI  in  EU  antidumping  cases  targeting  Japanese  firms  appears  to 
indicate that the EU administration in a number of cases had broader objectives then 
simply protecting profits of EU firms.  This may involve consumer interests as  in our 
analysis,  but political  imperatives  may  also  imply explicit  consideration of positive 
effects  of FDI on  employment  generation  and  the  wage  bill.  Future  empirical  and 
theoretical work could extend the  analysis  to  examine  antidumping  decisions  under 
objective  functions  in  which FDI  makes  a more  direct  contribution to  EU welfare. 
Another avenue for research could be the use of a common agency approach whereby 
the parties affected by the  antidumping policy are allowed to pay lobby contributions 
to  the  EU administration  which  are  related  to  their  relative  gains  and  losses  from 
antidumping protection. The EU's decision would then endogenously depend on these 
opposing forces. 
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26 Appendix A: Effect of a duty on EU welfare 
The EU welfare function in case of the imposition of a duty is: 
w = CS  + 7r  + t.q * 
The derivative of the welfare function with respect to the duty is calculated as: 
aWl  1  ,  - =-·C'I'·c+<I>.a-Q.c)  at  t~O  Ll 
where  Ll=C-4+k2)2 
'I' = k 5 
<I>=C4+4.k+3.e +3.k3 +e) 
Q = C4-k2 -2.e) 
It is derived that: 
for k=O 
for k=l  lS.a +c-c' > 0 
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Appendix B: Critical fixed costs 
The critical fixed  costs  that induce  a  switch from FDI  to  export  can be  derived  as 
follows: 
F'Duty=(7a) +F-(7c)=  8.
2
2  2 
C4-k  ) 
F'  FT =(7a) + F _ C7b)  C8 - 2.s+ k
2 .s).s 
4-e 
8 2  da+c-Cc'+s)C2-k)] 
F'  Und =C7a) + F - (7d)=  . 2  2  --"--"---'--:::--7-'--~ 
C4-k  )  C2-k2)2 
where 8 =c.k+a.C2+k)-c'.C2-k2)and ~ = a-c.(l-k). 




FDI Equilibrium (firm specific) 
P: Home price 
Figure 1:  ED Antidumping Measures under Bertrand 
Competition 
28 
.  ) Fixed costs 
Limited: {Duty, Export}, {Undertaking, Export} 
Inclusive: {Duty, Export} 
Limited: {Undertaking, Export 
Inclusive: {Duty, FDI 
I{no antidumping, FDI}I 




1·  c*!c 
Note: limited refers to a limited (ED industry profits) objective function of the ED administration while 
inclusive refers to an inclusive (ED welfare) function 
Figure 2:  Equilibria as  a  function  of fixed  FDI  costs  and cost 
asymmetry 
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